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EAST TIMOR
"DEVELOPMENT" OR COLONIALISM?

Rui Augusto Gomes
Researcher at
The Centro Leonardo Coimbra
and Núcleo de Estudos Sobre Timor e Ásia Pacífico
Faculdade de Letras
University of Oporto

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Rui Augusto Gomes[2]

Introduction

The most striking thing about East Timor is the dominance of a powerful Indonesian development (*pembangunan*) discourse. After the invasion and annexation of East Timor, the Indonesian government has indicated its political will to develop its "27th province". The allocation of money between the years 1976 and 1993, for example, was impressive; some US$2.4 billion (approximately US$2,500 for every person currently living in East Timor) was spent on *pembangunan* projects during this period (details in Table 1), an amount which could have turned this tiny homeland into a mini-Singapore had it been invested differently. This paper raises fundamental questions about the relative benefits of the New Order's twenty years of economic "development", *pembangunan* in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The achievements of *pembangunan* over the last two decades of Indonesian occupation are exceptional compared to five hundred years under Portuguese rule.

But, whilst economic "development" brought about significant changes, such as, an increase of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, and more people have access to education, health, and so on, there have also been negative outcomes as indicated by the dramatic increase in population as a result of massive migration into East Timor, the loss of life on the Timorese side, the locals' lack of

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[2] Researcher at the Centro Leonardo Coimbra and Núcleo de Estudos Sobre Timor e Ásia Pacífico, Faculdade de Letras, University of Oporto. The author would like to thank Ms. Carla Augusto for her editing help for this paper.

control over their resources, and the widening gap between the rich (mostly migrants) and the deprived. There have also been signs of increasing dissatisfaction amongst those with little or no memory of the invasion of 1975, who were expected to react positively to the generosity of Indonesians. Using my first hand experience combined with secondary research, I conclude that Indonesia's attempt to pacify the inhabitants of the eastern part of the island of Timor is not only illegal and brutal but has encouraged the emergence of a "nationalist" demand for freedom and, more specifically, for self-determination by the people of East Timor. The demand for freedom has been on the rise in recent years precisely because of the Indonesia's proclaimed economic "success".

The Representation of Economic "Development"

There are 27 pavilions in the "Beautiful Indonesia"-in-Miniature Park (Taman Mini "Indonesia Indah"), which is "a key site for the New Order's efforts to generate national unity, encourage loyalty around national development, and also reconfigure the Javanese aristocratic past to fit the New Order present" (Berger 1997, p. 20). They represent the 27 provinces of Indonesia. Unlike the rest of the pavilions, the East Timor pavilion has an Indonesian flag flying much of the time, an armed guard, and is air-conditioned. The flag makes emphatic the regime's insistence that East Timor is part of Indonesia; the armed guard serves to reinforce Suharto's commitment to the former Portuguese colony; the air-conditioner symbolizes the development the New Order is said to have brought to East Timor. (The air-conditioner may also be necessary to cool down tensions in East Timor?)

***Pembangunan*: A Groundless Monument**

When the Indonesians invaded East Timor, they affirmed that their soldiers had been "invited" by us to "restore order", a condition necessary to carry out "development" programs. The soldiers, mainly Javanese, came and proclaimed themselves as "liberators" and "peacekeepers". They put forward economic doctrines such as rapid growth, to disarm demands for freedom.

Pembangunan or economic "development" is what Indonesians call it. *Pembangunan* is a powerful

discourse used by Suharto and his Javanese imperium to maintain and expand the power of the New Order regime. Since 1980, Suharto has proudly identified himself as *Bapak Pembangunan* or the "Father of Development", in his efforts to legitimate the New Order. And, one important aspect of the hegemony of the Java-centered imperium has been the production of this powerful discourse, which has exhorted Indonesians to work together to develop the "nation" and bring about economic "take-off". Despite the rising criticism, the achievements made by the New Order have been visible, in particular in the areas of economic development and expansion since the last decade. Apparently, the results of *pembangunan* has been achieved at the expense of the implementation of various strategies: the reduction of the political parties from 20 to 3 parties in the early 1970s, the implementation of *Pancasila* and the legitimization of the "floating mass politics", the latter divorced ordinary people from politics to ensure that *pembangunan* is not disrupted. However, the economic "development" story has not been one of total success. One of the main sources responsible for the continuing tensions in Indonesia has been the widening gap between rich and poor, in spite of government claims of making progress in eradicating poverty. The widespread practices of corruption and nepotism, which have favored politically-connected business groups, violations of human rights, etc., all these provide the foundations for continuing demands for an immediate political reform. But, in spite of such perceptible growing criticism, the ideology of "development" has turned into a powerful factor which, to some extent, has successfully contained political debate in Indonesia and, hence, it has emerged as a key element for the legitimization of the New Order.

In East Timor, p*embangunan* has become very popular; it has filled up the East Timor's local newspaper, *Suara Timor Timur*. Even today the newly-elected heads of villages use the word on various occasions in their villages. The word is also sometimes used in speeches during wedding ceremonies. It appeared to promise something the Timorese thought they had lacked for more than four centuries.

Ironically, this conquering nation, that itself still suffered from serious underdevelopment,[3] promised

[3] The following figures will suffice to indicate that Indonesia is still placed 105th in terms of the HDI (Human Development Index), in spite of the New Order's proclaimed economic 'success'. For example, out of 191.2 million people in 1992, there were some 48% of people who were still living in absolute poverty. In the same year, there were 94.2 million and 106.7 million people who lived without access to safe water and sanitation, respectively. Some 8.7 million children under five

to solve East Timor's problems. Poverty, illiteracy, and backwardness, were regarded as direct results of Portuguese colonialism and the civil war of the mid-1970s. In its attempt to distance the West's criticism of human rights in Indonesia, Suharto continues to affirm that the "right to be free from poverty" is the realization of human rights. Today, the Indonesians insist that what they have done for East Timor goes far beyond anything that the Portuguese did in more than four centuries. In fact, there have been impressive achievements since 1975: the construction of 2,500 kilometers of roads, with some 700 kilometers already asphalted; the doctor-patient ratio has decreased from 1:25,000 in the early 1970s to 1:5,000 in 1990; there are now 579 elementary schools, 71 high schools, of which 24 are run by the Catholic missions, one new polytechnic, one university, and much more. Moreover, the growth rate of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) was almost 6% per annum between 1983 and 1986, or about 50% faster than Indonesia's growth rate. In 1990 East Timor's economy grew at 11.64%, this figure was higher than the growth rate of Indonesia's GDP which was 7.37% in the same period, etc.,[4] (more details on Table 2).

The Other Face of *Pembangunan*

The above figures present a picture of *pembangunan* as the Indonesians would like to see it. The figures, however, mask the real situation for most Timorese. For the indigenous peoples of East Timor, *pembangunan* has another face. The improvements in terms of the economy and infrastructure have not brought about major structural changes which favor the interests of the Timorese. Moreover, despite improvements in the economy and infrastructure as indicated by the figures above, such improvements do not reflect the real picture for Timorese. In fact, it is the migrants and not the indigenous people who have benefited and who represent these improvements. A brief discussion on the nature of some of the results of *pembangunan* can indicate to the fact that *pembangunan* itself is not as much of a panacea for the Timorese as the Indonesians wish it to be.

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were malnourished in 1992. The Indonesia's GNP (Gross National Product) per capita was US$270 lower than the average for all developing countries, that was, US$610, and so on. These figures combined, resulted in an index of 0.586 at the HDI standards. For more details on HDI for Indonesia, see (UNDP 1994, pp. 130, 134, 136, 174).

[4] These figures were taken from Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, pp. 52-60, 94-99, 220.

(a) Economic Growth and Maldistribution of Income

East Timor remains the poorest province in Indonesia on many social and economic indicators. In order for us to make a balanced judgment, I would like to cite a few numbers from the Portuguese colonial era. In 1972, the economic growth of East Timor was 6% with the value of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) at 1,835 million Escudos or approximately US$18.4 billion for a population of about 660,000 people. The economy has continued to grow since the early 1980s at an average of 5% per year. The highest growth rate occurred in 1990, 11.64% (see details in Table 3). Yet, this rapid economic growth rate still does not solve the problem of import. In fact, imports have always been higher than exports, thus, meaning greater dependence of the economy upon other regions outside East Timor. One example of this is in the import of rice: during the Portuguese period, there were no imports of rice as the territory produced its own at self-sufficient rates. Today, more than 29,000 tons of rice are imported from Java and Celebes (Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, p. 206).

The GDP alone can not explain the level of prosperity of a region like East Timor. Another indicator that could be used to measure the prosperity level is looking at the per capita income and its distribution. When the per capita income increases in absolute terms, this implies that the level of prosperity of the society improves. Table 4 indicates that since 1983, the income per capita in East Timor has increased from Rp. 132,454 in 1983 to Rp. 180,182 (US$90) in 1990, showing an increase of 7.29% per year. This means that there was an increase of more than 100% if compared to the level of per capita income during the Portuguese period which was US$60 per capita. Despite this increase, East Timor continues to have the lowest per capita income in Indonesia or approximately a quarter of the average for Indonesia (Rp. 650,000) in the same period.

However, the increase from Rp. 132,454 in 1980 to Rp. 180,182 in 1990 does not necessarily reflect the general level of prosperity of the people. The increase may be concentrated in the hands of a small group while the majority still lives in poverty. For example, Table 5 indicates that the low income group (40%) enjoyed only 10% of the regional income, whereas the high income group has 47.3% of the wealth and income in 1986. The 1990 period seemed a slight change in income distribution. For example, the low income group enjoyed 20% of the income and the high income

group still enjoyed more than 40% of the income (Saldanha 1994, pp. 190-7).

In 1993, there were 293,000 Timorese (26.24% of the total population of 821,368 inhabitants) who lived below the poverty line and could only expend less than US$10.00 per month. Today, 312 villages out of 442 villages are classified as poor by the standards[5] used by *Bappenas* (Indonesia National Planning Bureau) in spite of government claims of making progress in eradicating poverty (more details on Table 6). The eradication of poverty in East Timor has been made through two major programs, namely, the *Inpres Desa Tertinggal* (IDT)[6] and the *BTT Program*[7], a military project carried out by the Territorial Battalions. Both programs are funded by *Bappenas* (Maia 1995, pp. 68-68).

(b) Low Income Low Consumption of Proteins

Although the per capita income has increased since the mid-1980s, East Timor continues to have the lowest GDP per capita as a result of high living costs (Bappeda dan Statistik 1992a, p. 14). Until the mid-1990s, East Timor appeared to be among the highest in Indonesia in terms of the KFM (the Indonesian acronym for *Kebutuhan Fisik Miminum* of 'Minimum Physical Needs Index').[8] In 1990, the Minimum Physical Index for a couple with three children in East Timor was Rp 265,608, whereas in Jakarta the Index was Rp. 175,348. This means that in East Timor the average value and Index of Minimum Physical Needs for a worker and family with three children for a month was Rp

[5] Poverty is measured based on low housing quality, non-availability of basic sanitation and drinking water, inadequate of diet, malnutrition in children and high incidence of diseases.

[6] The basic idea of the IDT was to provide soft loans to poor villages. Each village was to receive Rp. 25 million. However, until October 1994, only 2% of the whole amount has actually been channeled to each of the poor villages in East Timor. This contradicts the objective of the program.

[7] In order to attract sympathy from the Timorese, the military have engaged in the construction of modest houses in the resettlement areas, small roads and bridges, water supply, etc. At this stage, it is difficult to affirm whether people's participation in the *BTT Program* is done voluntarily.

[8] The KFM of the 'Minimum Physical Needs Index' has been used by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics to measure different levels of cost of living across regions.

90,260 lower than the average for Indonesia. If we relate the Index to the real GDP per capita which in East Timor was Rp. 180,182 and >Rp 1.2 million for Jakarta, that means the majority of East Timorese live with a constant deficit of -Rp 7,073 per month. It is very common that by the end of the month, most of the low ranking civil servants have to borrow money in order to survive. In other words, the cost of living remains at higher rates than wages and salaries and hence, the majority of the population continues to face a lower standard of living. The growth rate of the real per capita GDP remained low, that is, 4.54% between 1983-1990[9] because of high population growth rates as a result of massive immigration. The growth rate of the per capita income has not changed much if we compare it with the average growth rate of per capita income in the early 1970s, recorded at >4% per year (Aldeia 1973, p. 34).

The low income level and low purchasing power are reflected in low levels of public expenditure. For example, the Indonesian statistics show that for 1993, 67.1% of the population's monthly per capita expenditure ranged between Rp. 10,000-30,000 (US$5.00-15.00) and 23.3% had a per capita expenditure between Rp. 30,000-60,000 (US$15.00-30.00) per month. The remaining 7.6% could expend between Rp. 60,000-200,000 (US$30.00-100.00) per month in the same period (BPS 1994, p. 590).

As a result of low income per capita, the Timorese are forced to live on a low-protein, high-starch diet of grain such as rice, corn or cassava. As can be seen from Table 8, the per capita consumption of meat in East Timor was 1.3 Kg per year in 1990, whereas the average Indonesian consumed 8.1 Kg per year; with regard to the per capita consumption of eggs, East Timor registered only 0.2 Kg per year, whereas the average Indonesian consumed 2.2 Kg per capita per year in 1990 and for the per capita consumption of fish, East Timor consumed 0.8 Kg per year, whereas Indonesia consumed 12.5 Kg per capita per year in 1990. Some 52.8% of children under 5 years are malnourished and 10% of adults suffer from iron-deficiency anemia; caloric intake averages between 1,400-1,900 cal/day and 30-38 gr. of protein from which only 9.7 gr. are animal proteins (meat, fish and eggs) (Bappeda dan Statistik 1991, p. 14; Bappeda 1991, p. 37; BPS 1994; Statistik Timor Timur 1994). As a consequence of low per capita income which forced the majority to eat less calories and proteins, there has been an increase in the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) from 13/1000 in the early

[9] For the per capita income see (Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, pp. 304-305; 1992a, p. 19).

1950s (Felgas 1956, p. 192) to 124/1000 in the 1990s (Saldanha 1994, pp. 273-275), and a low life expectancy of 48 years, a situation resembling that of the pre-colonial era. The East Timor's IMR remains high compared to the rest of other regions within the Indonesian archipelago (the average was 71/1000) (UNP 1994). Several factors keep it high, including: inadequate health care, high incidence of infectious disease (usually from contaminated drinking water) and poor conditions in the resettlement areas.

Moreover, malnourished individuals are disease-prone and too weak to work productively or think clearly. As a result, their children are also underfed and malnourished. For example, out of a population of 747,557 in 1990, 12.84% of the inhabitants never attended school, 62% did not finish elementary school, 12.11% completed primary school, 4% studied at junior high school, 1.5% completed high school and 0.15% attended higher education (Bappeda 1991, p. 47).

(c) The Disempowerment of the Timorese

The growing gap between rich and poor in GDP per capita has widened further since 1980. The rich (mostly migrants) have grown much richer, while the poor have stayed poor or grown even poorer. The uneven distribution of income is due to the fact that the majority of Timorese do not own businesses or shops like the migrants and the Chinese do. Table 9 shows that the migrants and the Chinese command 67% and 51.2%, respectively, of the large and medium-size businesses, in East Timor, in spite of the government's attempts to stimulate the emergence of local entrepreneurs. The migrants who have come to East Timor, many from Sulawesi, Bali and Java, totally control street commerce.

Another aspect of disempowerment of the Timorese is in the area of recruiting public civil servants. For example, the majority of the high ranking officials (*Golongan III and IV*) are migrants. They are recruited to work in the local government's agencies, the *Dinas* ("government agency/service") and bureaus and, more than 90% of officials working at the sectoral agencies, the *KANWILS* (the Indonesian acronym for *Kantor Wilayah* or "Regional Offices"), operating in East Timor, are migrants. While the migrants occupy positions in the government administration, thousands of young

Timorese who have left school continue to wander in search of jobs and for their survival. Whilst some are refused jobs because their names appear on the "black list", others cannot get a job because a growing number of the posts are occupied by the "newcomers". This indicates that in two decades of Suharto's rule of East Timor his *pembangunan* strategy had only produced a richer minority (mostly migrants) in a deprived colony. The more the funds are poured into East Timor for its "development" program, the higher the number of migrants who benefit from such impressive amounts of money.

(d) Deforestation and Surveillance

As for ecology, *pembangunan* has meant the destruction of the natural habitat. Gradual fragmentation of the land began in 1976 when East Timor was invaded and occupied by the Indonesian and Javanese troops and, particularly, land degradation has taken place where the population has begun to expand more rapidly than the available land for agriculture. What was once fertile land is no longer used for agriculture as a result of military operations. For better military surveillance of the guerrillas, huge amounts of forest have been burnt. Today, the degradation process of the forests is reaching an advanced stage. For instance, the amount of critical land has increased as a result of massive immigration and military operations. Table 10 indicates the amount of forest destroyed between 1980 and 1992. It should be noted, however, that the 14,087 hectares do not include primary and secondary forests that were burnt by the Indonesian military during the first years of invasion and after the Santa Cruz massacre, for surveillance purposes. Vast areas of tropical forests were incinerated and destroyed for better surveillance of the guerrillas, leaving these areas at risk. For instance, a large part (>7,000 hectares) of the forested area in Bucoli (Baucau) was burnt by the military just after the Dili massacre. This has had an impact upon the levels of ground water and springs in the area. In 1991, some 78% of the total land of East Timor were classified as critical land (Carrascalao 1992, p. 10), as a result of a systematic destruction of forests.

Nowadays, when East Timor needs 47% of forest cover in order to protect its water resources for domestic consumption and irrigation of agricultural lands, the forest area was reduced to 20% by 1995. In terms of land utilization for agricultural purposes, only 10% of the land (1,460.9 square

kilometers) is available. Obviously, the area is not proportional in relation to the majority of Timorese who make their living out of agriculture. If the population of East Timor in 1995 was 871,707 people and approximately 697,366 people (80%) live from agriculture, the land ratio for agriculture in relation to the amount of farmers decreased to 0.22 hectares per person (in 1975 the land-man ratio was 2 hectares).

Evidence of deforestation is also cited in a range of studies of the *transmigrasi* areas. For example, a noted Indonesian academic, George Aditjondro (1994, p. 60) registered visual evidence of the total destruction of sandalwood, one of East Timor's strategic raw materials, leading to a dramatic decline in production and export. For example, the production of sandalwood recorded in 1987 was 320 tons, but plummeted to 11 tons in 1991. This has resulted in a decline in the export of sandalwood oil and powder. The figures do not include the massive destruction of sandalwood in the early 1980s by army personnel. Obviously, the destruction of sandal trees significantly affected East Timor's fragile economy. Similarly, there has been a dramatic decrease in coffee export from 5,000 tons in 1974 to 1,200 tons in the 1980s. Twenty years after the invasion, both coffee and sandal products do not represent one-third of the amount exported prior to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

Table 11 indicates the population density of migrants in fragile zones of Dili where access to agricultural land is limited. In terms of land utilization, there are only 22.7 square kilometers (6.89% of the total area) of land in Dili suitable for settlement (Bappeda dan Statistik 1994, p. 11; Kantor Statistik 1991, p. 7). This means that the current density level in Dili is more than 6,000 people per square kilometer. This figure exceeds that of Singapore (4,332 people/sq. kilometer) or Hong Kong (5,429 people/sq. kilometer) in 1990 (ADB 1993, p. 4). The situation becomes more complicated because the farmers who live around Dili are nomads and, the majority of them, practice traditional agriculture. Today, there are more than 15,000 hectares of land in Dili that is classified as critical land. The mountains surrounding Dili, which were previously covered by *Eucalyptus Sp., Aquilaria Sp., Tamarindus indica, Albizzia falcataria, Acacia leucophloea, Pterocarpus indica, Intsia bijuga* and other native tress, have now disappeared. As a result of this, the erosive process has accelerated and it varies between the medium and high levels, thus reducing the capacity to support any human life in the near future.

As a matter of fact, land degradation has received little attention from the Indonesian bureaucracy. Indonesia has practiced the same environmentally destructive policies in other regions. To give an example of the lack of attention to the environment in East Timor, between 1985 and 1992 only 0.3% of the total budget was allocated to environmental projects. In 1992 alone, the amount of funds for the resettlement project, which was carried out by the OPSTER (its acronym for military territorial operation), registered 3.9% of the total budget of the fiscal year, whereas only 0.6% out of the budget was allocated for the environment. And it is unlikely that these environmental concerns would be addressed immediately or perhaps the inhabitants would have to survive with such impoverished lands until they were given the right to sustain, shelter and to control their lives and futures. The lack of funds for the protection of the environment partly reflects the fact that land degradation is a serious problem in East Timor, and perhaps the New Order state continues to deny the most basic human rights.

(e) The Displacement of Timorese from Their Lands

The inundation (see Table 12) of migrants (*pendatang*), both the spontaneous migrants and or through the *transmigrasi* program, has become one of the strategies of the neo-colonisation, for these migrants have appropriated land and resources that belonged to the indigenous people. In particular, the upper lands of the center and west of East Timor, were formerly used by each family (*knua*) for coffee plantation. Coffee used to be a highly valued commodity in the past which the Timorese used as a means of acquiring instruments for agriculture and other commodities for daily consumption. Similarly, the low lands were areas that produced coconut which was sold at great value. Both the migrants and "transmigrants", however, are placed in more fertile lands were the Timorese used for planting rice and gardening (*to'os*).

The worst of the so-called *pembangunan* was that it not only displaced the locals from their primordial ties, but also imposed "new" cultural traits upon them. This gave rise to serious resistance. The struggle to retain dignity has intensified even more as Indonesians, in the name of *kebudayaan nasional* or "national culture", continue to manifest their (Javanese) cultural

superiority.[10] What is known as *kebudayaan nasional* is the manifestation of a culture grounded on extreme racial prejudices and ethnic pride. Anderson (1993, p. 25) described the relationship between the Indonesians and Timorese as that of the "superior and civilized towards the inferior and barbarous." However, the imposition of the Javanese culture upon the locals has produced strong resistance and this encourages the military to reinforce their spy system, increase the number of troops, and to maintain a reign of terror. Thus the continuing presence of Javanese troops has literally meant the death of a society and a culture. Hatred has become the only mechanism of survival.

Pembangunan: Some Areas of Fiction

One of the areas of fiction has been in the construction of roads. Indonesia insists that there were no more than 12 kilometers of asphalted roads in East Timor during the Portuguese colonialism. But if we look at the Portuguese statistics of 1973 (see Table 2), there were already some 2,033 kilometers of road length. If this is true, then we can say that after 20 years of Indonesian occupation and "development", only 533 kilometers of new roads were constructed or 26.65 kilometers of new roads each year.

Another area of fiction is in the construction of health facilities. The Indonesian government insists that there were only 8 hospitals in 1975. The Portuguese statistics (as in Table 2) indicate that in 1972 there were already 10 public hospitals and 1 private hospital, 12 maternities, 51 public health centers and 3 emergency units, serving by 20 doctors and 88 paramedics (Aldeia 1973, p. 86). This means that not a single hospital was built by Indonesia but only 17 public health centers were built. Despite the proclaimed achievements made by Indonesia in health infrastructure, Hughes (1995, p. 1), reporting on a visit made by Simon de Faux to East Timor affirms that, in fact, the hospitals and

[10] Javanese culture has functioned as a tool for political, social and cultural engineering under Suharto's New Order state which seeks to assimilate and unify diverse cultures of the Indonesian archipelago in a single way of life, that of the Javanese, who have been regarded as the 'true' Indonesians by the present regime. This criticism appears in Skephi and Monroe (1993, p. 247).

public health centers in East Timor are under equipped and they served by inexperienced doctors and paramedics. The patients prefer to go to private health centers owned by the Catholic Church rather than visiting the state hospitals and health centers due to suspicion.

As to the area of education, the Indonesian government maintains that the Portuguese built 30 schools, thus, resulting in a high illiteracy rate of 92% of the population. However, in 1973, there were 456 primary schools, 17 Chinese schools and 1 Arabic school, 7 junior high schools, 1 high school, 1 school for teacher training, 1 school for Catholic catechists and 2 vocational schools (public health and arts) (Aldeia 1973, p. 82; Scharfe 1996, p. 163) (Table 2). In fact, the Indonesian schools are instruments of legitimizing the presence of Indonesia in the territory, where *Bahasa Indonesia* is used as the main language of teaching. Also, it is through these schools that the Timorese learn a series of alien symbols and values ingrained in the Hindu-Javanese concept of *ksatria* ("knight"). The *ksatria* concept has been used to cultivate the importance of military discipline and loyalty, and promote a forced understanding that there are substantial links between civilians and the military. The Timorese are taught reverence for the national leadership, which simply means loyalty to Suharto; therefore, opposition of any form is intolerable.

Moreover, under the present governor, Abílio Osório, for example, two projects have become priorities for he believes that projects, such as, *Program Pemantapan Integrasi* or "the program for the consolidation of integration," and *Pembinaan Pemuda untuk Memperkokoh Persatuan dan Kesatuan* or "the education of the youth for the strengthening of [Indonesia's] unity," will create pre-conditions necessary to carry out other "development" programs. But, in reality, such projects have been developed to serve the needs of Jakarta's project of "reunion", which has failed during two decades of Indonesia's occupation of the territory.

Conclusion: *Pembangunan* and the Emergence of Timorese Nationalism

I have outlined my argument that *pembangunan*, despite its presentation as a program of "beneficial development", nevertheless constitutes a justification and camouflage for the essentially imperialistic and coercive character of Indonesian control over East Timor. Indeed, Indonesia's "development"

scheme in East Timor, itself is inextricably associated with the continuation of colonialism and, hence, has produced and strengthened the "nationalist" movement in East Timor. Throughout this paper, I have tried to show that the relationship between the Indonesian state and East Timor is a colonial one. More specifically, I have argued that a key effect of the Indonesian government's program of *pembangunan* ("development") has been the subjugation of the majority of the East Timorese people to the interests of government officials, outside economic interests and the migrant population. I have highlighted several examples to illustrate this relationship, including the unequitable distribution of the "development" benefits between the migrants and the indigenous population, oppressive surveillance of the indigenous population, malnutrition and the Timorese's lack of control over their resources.

Today, the unilaterally-proclaimed *pembangunan* of East Timor is invoked in the name of Indonesia's national interests, which is yet another way of sustaining the Java-centered New Order state in this Portuguese ex-colony. The *pembangunan* project, which I have been describing, has been represented to the Timorese as bringing "civilization" and as a means of "re-uniting" the Timorese and restoring their "traditional relationship with Indonesia". Spreading large numbers of Javanese, Balinese, Sundanese, Macassarenese across the ethnic mosaic of East Timor island is expected to somehow increase the consciousness towards the state's philosophy, "unity in diversity". By resettling the "true" Indonesians into East Timor, presumably loyal to the central government, is also being conceived as a strategy to counter regional insurgencies and rebellions.

Despite the political rhetoric, the bestiality of the Indonesian occupation is obvious. Aditjondro described it as a "culture of violence" (pp. 37-40, 46-54) which involves the systematic violation of the rights of a conquered people. Under the slogans of "one nation" and "one society" which have been "maintained" through violence, the uncompromising and oppressive rule of Suharto seems as unchangeable as anywhere else in the "sleeping" empire. But the use of violence to "restore order" has been self-defeating. The imposition of a "culture of violence" upon the Timorese has resulted in positive outcomes. Indonesia's nefarious aggression to "liquidate" the inhabitants of the "twenty-seventh province," a dream that did not become a reality, has compelled the East Timorese to move towards one direction, independence. This has led to an "awakening" of a *unidade nacional Timorense* or a Timorese "national unity". Indonesia's "nationalist" project has, in a sense, turned

into a "colonial" project, which reveals Indonesia's failure to unify the Timorese with Indonesians, (Anderson 1993, p. 27) at the same time as it has united Timorese with each other. In line with Anderson's argument, Mark Berger has pointed out that "a common consciousness and a sense of shared identity" has emerged "as a direct result of the overwhelming power of the New Order state," (Berger 1996, p. 22; Anderson 1993) which has been camouflaged with *pembangunan*.

But *pembangunan*, can no longer be regarded as the panacea for the Timorese. *Pembangunan* can not delay the emergence of a Timorese national consciousness any longer. Indeed, the natives of East Timor understand that Indonesian "civilization" is incapable of providing them with the things which might make them forget their concern for dignity. The pro-independence movement, backed by the present generation in East Timor, continues to make its own history in the face of *pembangunan*.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Budget Allocation for the "Development" of East Timor, 1976-1992

Year	*Sectoral (Rp. Thousand)*	*Routine (Rp. Million)**	*Amount** (Rp. Thousand)*
1976	836,900	1,475.6	838,375.6
1977	898,547	3,261.6	901,808.6
1978	1,011,445	3,134.6	1,014,579.6
1979	4,333,421	3,150.0	4,336,571.0
1980	8,380,670	6,954.4	8,387,624.4
1981	12,201,074	8,435.5	12,209,509.5
1982	24,384,505	8,846.8	24,393,351.8
1983	22,952,567	9,432.1	22,961,999.1
1984	27,939,026	20,015.1	27,959,041.1
1985	40,345,864	13,038.6	40,358,902.6
1986	22,647,412	13,071.3	22,660,483.3
1987	26,593,112	11,218.1	26,604,330.1
1988	24,803,144	11,516.3	24,814,660.3
1989	20,372,319	14,765.2	20,387,084.2
1990	43,602,755	17,037.4	43,619,792.4
1991	80,535,305	18,859.4	80,554,164.4
1992	106,490,565	18,932.6	106,509,497.6

Legend: * quoted in Saldanha 1994, p. 160
** this amount does not include the Presidential Instruction (*Inpres*) budget totaling Rp. 432 billion

Source: Bappeda 1993

Budget Allocation for the "Development" of East Timor, 1976-1992



Table 2: Positive Indicators of *Pembangunan*

Indicators	*Under Indonesia*	*Under Portuguese*
Road length	2,500 km	2,033 km
Asphalted Road	700 km	12 km
Primary Schools	650	456
Chinese Schools	none	17
Junior High Schools	102	7
High Schools	35	5
Illiteracy	60-70%	>90%
Hospitals	10	11
Public Health Centers	67	51
Maternities	N/A.	12
Doctor-Patient Ratio	1:5,000	1:25,000
Ec. Growth Rate	11.64% in 1990	6% (average)
Per Capita Income	US$90	US$60
Man-Land Ratio	0.22 hectares	>2 hectares

Legend: N/A. → not available
Sources: Aldeia 1972; Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b

Table 3: Development of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Population of East Timor, 1960, 1970, 1972, 1982, 1987, 1990

Year	*GDP*	*Growth of GDP*	*Population*
1960	1.141,1*	-4.9	517,079
1970	1.639*	5.7	632,700
1972	1.835*	5.6	660,000
1982	62.101,2**	5.0	592,279
1987	103.166,0**	8.1	677,489
1990	140.000,0**	11.6	747,557

Legend: * value in million Contos (1 Conto = 1000 Portuguese Escudos)
** value in million Rupiah

Sources: Aldeia 1972; Bappeda dan Statistik 1992a; Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b

Table 4: Development of per Capita Income of East Timor, 1983-1990 (at 1983 constant price)

Year	*Income Rp.*	*Index (*)*
1983	132,454	100.0
1984	136,920	100.4
1985	141,724	197.8
1986	144,141	108.8
1987	152,349	115.0
1988	161,426	121.6
1989	166,748	121.6
1990	180,182	136.5

Source: Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, pp. 292-4
(*) Estimations made by Saldanha (1994, p. 198)

Table 5: Distribution of Income, 1986, 1987, 1990

Year	*Gini Ratio*	*40% lower*	*40% average*	*40% higher*
1986	0.43	10.07	39.65	47.28
1987	0.228	26.5	39.2	34.7
1990	0.346	20.4	36.0	43.7

Source: Saldanha 1994, p. 199

Distribution of Income and Gini Ratio, 1986,1987, 1990



Table 6: Some Indicators on Poverty in the 1990s

1. 26.24% (293,000 people) lived below the poverty line in 1993.

2. Income per capita Rp. 132,454/US$73.6 in 1983 and Rp. 209,137/US$99.6 in 1992.

3. Monthly per capita expenditure below Rp. 27,900/US$13.50 for urban people and Rp. 18,240/US$9.00 for rural people.

4. 312 villages (70.60%) out of 442 villages are classified as *desa tertinggal* (impoverished villages) in terms of low caloric intake, malnutrition in children, occurrences of diseases, inadequate diets, no drinking water and bad sanitary conditions.

5. Illiteracy rate for women 70% and 40% for men.

6. Caloric intake averages 1,400-1,900 cal/day and approximately 30-38 grams of proteins from which only 9.7 grams are animal proteins (meat, fish and eggs).

7. 52.8% of children under 5 years are malnourished and 10% of adults suffer from anemia and Vitamine. A deficiency.

8. IMR = 124/1000 births.

9. Life Expectancy: 48 years.

Sources: Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b; Statistik Timor Timur 1994; Bappeda 1991

Table 7: Minimum Physical Needs Index in Selected Areas, 1990

(in Rupiah)

Region	*F1*	*F2*	*F3*
East Timor	103,929	217,820	265,608
Irian Jaya	105,658	204,685	264,794
Aceh	67,466	156,206	187,428
Jakarta	68,736	147,925	175,348
East Nusa Tenggara	79,628	146,939	182,234
North Sulawesi	63,275	137,483	164,755
Yogyakarta	51,792	130,571	161,939

Legend: F1 → a single person
F2 → a couple with 2 children
F3 → a couple with 3 children

Source: Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b, p. 304

Table 8: Consumption of Proteins in East Timor and Indonesia, 1990

(in kilograms per year)

Nation	*Meat*	*Eggs*	*Fish*
East Timor	1.3	0.2	0.8
Indonesia	8.1	2.2	12.5

Source: Bappeda 1991

Consumption of Proteins in East Timor and Indonesia, 1990 (in kilograms)

Consumption of Meat in East Timor and Indonesia, 1990



Consumption of Eggs in East Timor and Indonesia, 1990



Consumption of Fish in East Timor and Indonesia, 1990



Nation	Meat	Eggs	Fish
East Timor	1,3	0,2	0,8
Indonesia	8,1	2,2	12,5

Table 9: Companies by Scale and Owners, 1993

Size	*Timorese*	*Chinese Timorese*	*Outsider*	*Chinese Outsider*	*Total*
Large	35	17	57	48	157
Medium	559	119	565	152	1,395
Small	803	396	657	39	1,897
Total	1,397	532	1,279	239	3,449

Source: Kantor Wilayah Perdagangan Timor Timur, 1993 in Saldanha 1995, p. 86

Companies by Scale and Owners, 1993



Table 10: Area Deforested Yearly for *Transmigrasi* Program, 1989-1993

Area	*1989*	*1990*	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*
North	29	N/A.	5630	N/A.	N/A.
South	925	1036	2622	N/A.	N/A.
E. Timor	954	1036	8532	402	3443

Legend: N/A. → not available but the amount of forest destroyed have increased. These figures do not include the area of forests burnt for military surveillance of the guerrillas.

Source: Bappeda dan Statistik 1994, p. 208

Table 11: Area, Number of Inhabitants, Population Growth, and Density in Selected Areas, 1980, 1990, 1992

District/ Region	*Area Km2*	*Pop. 1980*	*Pop. 1990*	*Pop. 1992*	*r 1980*	*r 1992*	*Pop. Growth 1980-92*
Covalima	1,226	25,819	45,547	48,464	21	40	4.1
Aileu	729	15,162	24,852	27,301	21	37	6.6
Liquiça	548	29,549	44,539	48,195	54	89	5.3
Ermera	746	56,397	77,974	82,929	75	111	4.0
Dili	372	67,737	124,537	140,234	180	377	9.1
E. Timor	18,899	555,350	747,557	796,317	29	42	3.6

Legend: r → density (people per square kilometer)

Sources: Compiled from Bappeda dan Statistik 1994; Bappeda dan Statistik 1992b; Kantor Statistik 1991, pp. 1, 4, 7.

Table 12: East Timor Demographic Profile, 1916-2000

Year	Population	r	d	Period
1916(a)	394,518	1.1	21	(1882-1916)
1927(a)	451,604	1.1	24	(1882-1927)
1936(a)	460,104	0.4	24	(1927-1936)
1946	403,232	-0.4	21	(1936-1946)
1948(a)	420,430	0.7	22	(1936-1948)
1950(a)	442,378	1.7	23	(1948-1950)
1960(a)	517,079	1.7	27	(1950-1960)
1965(a)	555,723	1.5	29	(1960-1965)
1970(a)	632,700	1.7	33	(1960-1970)
1973	671,600	1.7	35	(1960-1973)
1975(b)	695,000	1.7	37	(1960-1975)
1980(c)	555,350	-1.8	29	(1970-1980)
1990(c)	747,557	3.2	39	(1980-1990)
1995(c)	871,707	3.6	46	(1990-1995)
2000(d)	1,139,397	3.6	78	(1995-2000)

Legend: r → annual population growth rate (%)
d → density (people per sq. km)
(a) → Based on Portuguese Censuses of 1916, 1927, 1936, 1948, 1950, 1960, 1965, 1970
(b) → Agência Geral do Ultramar (1965, p. 23); Neonbasu (1991)
(c) → Kantor Statistik (1991, p. 10) based on Indonesian Census of 1980
(d) →The exponential formulae[11] used as a method of prediction, is:

$$P_t = P_o e^{at+\frac{bt^2}{2}}$$

where P_o = Population at the beginning of the time period being considered.
P_t = Population after 't' years.
'e' = is a mathematical expression of natural growth.
'a' represents the growth rate per year at time t=0.
'b' a factor that adjusts 'a' over time (Newman 1995, p. xvi).

[11] The 'exponential' approach is used to calculate the population growth rates in East Timor based on the assumption that the growth occurs continuously.

East Timor Demographic Profile, 1916-2000



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